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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20030695-CA

JASON NOALL,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for theft, a second degree felony, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), in the Second Judicial District, Weber County, the
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he referred to matters that were
properly admitted?
A court reviews a claim of prosecutorial misconduct "in light of the totality of the
evidence presented at trial," to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks called
attention to matters the jurors "could not properly consider" and to determine whether
"there is a reasonable likelihood that without the error the result would have been more
favorable for the defendant." State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997); State v.

Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990). The trial court's "rulings on whether
the prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of
discretion." Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with second degree felony theft. R. 1. The State moved
for a pre-trial order admitting defendant's earlier convictions for stealing cars from car
dealerships—one for not returning a car he had taken for a test drive and one for using a
duplicate key made during a test drive to later take the test-driven car from the lot.
R. 20-21. The trial court denied the motion. R. 147: [Tab 1], at 5. A jury convicted
defendant as charged. R. 86. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of one to fifteen years. R. 126. Defendant timely appealed. R. 128.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 17, 2002, defendant and two friends entered J.W. Auto Sales in
Ogden. R. 146:52-53. Defendant told Thomas Salazar, a car salesman, that he wanted to
purchase a sports utility vehicle. R. 146:54. Salazar allowed defendant to take a Blazer
for a test drive. R. 146:57. When an hour or two later defendant had not returned the
Blazer, Salazar, who had not asked for defendant's identification, called the police.
R. 146:60. Salazar described defendant to the police. Id.
A confidential informant later gave police a tip regarding defendant's possible
involvement. R. 146:77. Based on that tip, Detective Jeff Pickrell prepared a photo
spread. R. 146:77-79. When Pickrell showed Salazar the photo spread, Salazar
identified defendant as the thief. R. 146:61-62, 83-84.
2

The vehicle was recovered about two weeks later. R. 146:84. Defendant was not
driving the vehicle at that time. R. 146:84-85.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
No misconduct occurred. The prosecutor did not call the jurors' attention to
matters they could not properly consider. First, a witness explained that police had
prepared a photo array that included defendant's photo because they had received a tip
that defendant was possibly involved. The trial court ruled the testimony admissible for
the limited purpose of explaining why the police prepared the photo array as they did.
The prosecutor referred to the tip only for that purpose.
Moreover, even if the prosecutor had referred to the tip for other purposes, his
comments were permissible. Defendant opened the door to the prosecutor's rebuttal
statements when he suggested, in his closing, that the police had manipulated the spread
to elicit an identification of defendant.
In any case, defendant has demonstrated no harm. The jury learned nothing new
from the challenged reference to the tip. The prosecutor had referred to the tip, without
objection, during his opening statement. Later, when testimony was given, the court had
allowed evidence of the tip to come in, albeit for limited purposes only, again without
objection. Finally, the prosecutor commented on the tip in his closing argument, once
more without objection. Defendant objected only when the prosecutor mentioned the tip
for the fourth time in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument. Thus, at the point
where defendant objected, information about the tip had already been presented to the
jury—both in contexts requiring use of the information for limited purposes only and in
3

contexts where no limitation was requested or imposed. Thus, the jury learned nothing
new from the prosecutor's reference to the tip in his rebuttal to defendant's closing
argument. Moreover, the jury had been instructed regarding the proper use of the tip
evidence. Finally, in light the evidence in its totality, there is no reasonable likelihood
that the prosecutor's reference to the tip in rebuttal, even if impermissible, affected the
outcome.
ARGUMENT
NO
MISCONDUCT
OCCURRED—THE
PROSECUTOR'S
REBUTTAL REFERENCE TO THE TIP THAT CAUSED POLICE
TO PREPARE THE PHOTO SPREAD DID NOT CALL THE
JURORS' ATTENTION TO MATTERS THEY COULD NOT
PROPERLY
CONSIDER,
DID NOT PLACE
HEARSAY
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JURY, AND, IN ANY EVENT, WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL
Defendant claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he stated, in
rebuttal to defendant's closing argument, that the detective who prepared the photo array
"didn't just pull [defendant's] name out of the hat" and that "[t]here was some reason to
put together a full lineup with [defendant's] picture in there." R. 146:127; Br. Appellant
at 6, 12.
To show prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that the prosecutor's
remarks "call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they could not properly
consider in determining their verdict." Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925. A defendant must
also show that "in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," any error was
"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that without the
error the result would have been more favorable for the defendant." Fixel, 945 P.2d at
4

151; Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925. A prosecutor is entitled to respond to a defendant's
claims, and a prosecutor does not commit misconduct by addressing matters to which a
defendant has "opened the door." Id.
Here, no misconduct occurred. The trial court had earlier ruled that information
about the tip was admissible to show why the detective included defendant's picture in
the photo array. The prosecutor referred to the tip in closing argument rebuttal for that
purpose. Moreover, defendant "opened the door" to the prosecutor's response when he
argued that the photo spread was so suggestive that, but for the photo spread, the witness
would not have identified defendant. Finally, in light of the totality of the evidence
presented at trial, the prosecutor's statement was harmless. It was not reasonably likely
the verdict would have been more favorable to defendant had the prosecutor not made the
challenged statement.
Background. Prior to opening statements at trial, the trial judge instructed the
jury that some evidence would be admitted for a limited purpose. R. 146:44. She told
the jurors that when she informed them that evidence was admissible only for a limited
purpose, they must consider it for that limited purpose only. Id. The judge also
instructed the jury that statements and arguments of the attorneys "are not evidence in the
case." R. 146:44.
During his opening statement, the prosecutor explained the theft. R. 146:48-49.
He also explained that Ogden police officers received "a tip from a confidential
informant that the defendant may be a suspect in this case" and that, based on the tip,

5

Detective Jeff Pickrell put together the photo spread. R. 146:49. Defendant did not
object to this statement.
During the State's presentation of its case, the prosecutor questioned Detective
Pickrell about his investigation of the theft. R. 146:76-77. After Detective Pickrell stated
that he began with a description of the thief, but with no leads, the prosecutor asked him
to describe what happened next. R. 146:77. Detective Pickrell stated, "I got a lead. One
of the gang detectives came to me, and a confidential informant had told him that—." Id.
Defense counsel objected to any answer coming in for the truth of the matter
asserted. Id, The prosecutor responded that he was offering the testimony only to show
why Detective Pickrell put together the photo spread and "not for the truth of the matter."
Id.
The trial judge ruled that the testimony could come in as "preparatory comments,"
admitted solely "for the purpose of showing why [the detective] did what he did, as
opposed to any kind of truth of the matter asserted." R. 146:77-78. She explained to the
jury that she had earlier instructed them that some evidence was admissible for limited
purposes only. Id. at 78. She told the jury that this was an example. Id. "It's just coming
in solely as a preparatory statement to indicate why [the detective] did what he did." Id.
The prosecutor then elicited testimony that Detective Pickrell got information
through an officer from a confidential informant indicating that defendant might be a
suspect. Id. On the basis of that information, the detective "composed a photo lineup."
Id. Defense counsel raised no objection to this testimony.

6

Detective Pickrell also testified to the recovery of the stolen vehicle approximately
two weeks later. R. 146:84.
Defendant called no witnesses.
During closing argument, the prosecutor summarized the State's case.
R. 146:115-21. Referring to the photo spread, the prosecutor said, "Remember, Detective
Pickrell did not just pick his name out of a hat. Okay. He did have some information
that defendant was a suspect when he put that photo lineup together. Okay? He didn't do
it because he had a bias or something against him; he did it because he had that
information." R. 146:117. Defendant did not object to this argument. Id.
Defense counsel then argued defendant's theory of the case. R. 146:121-26. He
argued that Salazar may have misidentified defendant as the individual who took the
stolen vehicle for a test drive. R. 146:121-23. Specifically, he argued that the photo
spread was unduly suggestive, that defendant's photo was the only photo in the spread
that matched Salazar's description of the thief, and that viewing defendant's photo in the
photo spread, as contrasted with viewing defendant at the time of the test drive, may have
resulted in Salazar's identification of defendant as the thief. Id J
In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the photo spread was not suggestive and that
all the subjects matched Salazar's description. R. 146:128. He reiterated that "the

Defense counsel also argued that even if defendant was the individual who took
the vehicle for a test drive, he may have returned it to the lot and someone else may have
stolen it between the time it was returned and the time the salesman reported it missing.
R. 146:125.
7

detective didn't just pull [defendant's] name out of the hat.. .. There was some reason to
put together a full lineup with his picture in there." R. 146:127.
Defendant objected to the statement, arguing that the "evidence was admitted for a
limited purpose and not that the defendant committed the crime." Id. The prosecutor
responded that he was only arguing the matter "to show the reason the detective did what
he did." R. 146:128. "He had a reason to put together the photo lineup, and he did. He
didn't just come up with this name out of a hat or because he didn't like [defendant]." Id.
The trial court did not sustain the objection, but cautioned that the prosecutor should limit
his argument to that. Id. Defendant made no further objection. Id.
The court gave the jury written jury instructions to use during deliberations.
R. 146:135-36. The written instructions reiterated the oral instructions given before
opening statements. Instruction 7 cautioned: "Some evidence is admitted for a limited
purpose only. When I instruct you that an item of evidence has been admitted for a
limited purpose, you must consider it for that limited purpose and for no other." R. 51.
Instruction 6 stated: "Statements and arguments of lawyers are not evidence in the case,
unless made as an admission or stipulation of fact." R. 50.
The jury returned a guilty verdict. R. 86. Defendant subsequently brought a
motion to arrest judgment. R. 94-95. Among other things, defendant claimed that the
prosecutor had improperly argued facts that the jury could not consider when he argued
that defendant's photo had not been included in the photo spread by chance. Id. The trial
court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. R. 147: Tab 3. The court found that the
prosecutor's closing arguments were proper. R. 147: Tab 3, at 5. First, the prosecutor
8

referred to evidence of the tip for the same limited purpose for which the court had
already admitted it and, second, he repeated to the jury the court's limitation on how the
information could be used. Id. The court therefore found that the prosecutor committed
no misconduct and, in any event, the challenged statements were not harmful. R. 121-22.
A.

The prosecutor's closing argument was not improper.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor called the jurors' attention to matters they

were not permitted to consider when he argued that the detective had some reason to
prepare the photo array. Br. Appellant at 12. The prosecutor's argument was not
improper. The trial court had already ruled that the prosecutor could refer to the tip the
detective had received to explain why he prepared a photo array that included defendant's
picture. Moreover, defense counsel's closing argument "opened the door" to the
prosecutor's argument. Defense counsel argued that all evidence of defendant's
involvement could have stemmed from the allegedly suggestive character of the photo
array and that defendant's photo array picture "might as well have just [had] a sign" on it
saying "Pick me." R. 146:122-23.
1.

The prosecutor's statement referred to the evidence for a purpose the trial
court had already ruled permissible.
The trial court had already admitted evidence of the tip to explain why Detective

Pickrell prepared a photo array that included defendant's picture. R. 146:78. Defendant
has not challenged the trial court's ruling on that matter.
Here, in his rebuttal to defendant's closing argument, the prosecutor again drew
the jury's attention to the tip to explain why defendant's picture had been included in the
9

spread. Following defendant's closing argument attempts to undermine the propriety of
the photo array, the prosecutor once more explained that the police officer prepared the
photo array because he had received a tip and not because he randomly chose defendant's
picture or because he selected defendant's picture for some improper reason. R. 146:12123; 127. Further, the prosecutor reiterated to the jury the judge's ruling that the jury
could consider the information only for the purpose of explaining why the investigator
prepared the photo spread. Id. Thus, the argument was proper, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ruled that the argument was proper. See R. 146:128 (trial
court permitting prosecutor's reference to the tip for limited purpose); see also R. 122
(trial court holding, in context of a post-trial challenge to the prosecutor's argument, that
"[t]he prosecutor's mention of that information [the tip] and its limited purpose in closing
argument was not misconduct and was harmless").
2.

A prosecutor is entitled to address defense counsel's closing argument during
rebuttal.
Moreover, a prosecutor is entitled to respond, on rebuttal, to a defendant's points

in closing argument. See State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990)
(prosecutor's statement that defendant refused to participate in lineup was fair where
prosecutor was responding to defendant's point in closing argument that a lineup was not
conducted); see also State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973) (rebuttal "in direct
reply to the theory advanced by defense counsel in his final argument" and "within the
range of reasonable inferences which could be drawn from the evidence" is proper).
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Where a defendant "open[s] the door," a response is "clearly not misconduct." See
Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925.
Here, defense counsel suggested in closing argument that Salazar, the car
salesman, identified defendant only because defendant's picture was included in the
photo array. R. 146:122-23. Moreover, defense counsel argued that the detective had
included no other photo that matched Salazar's description of the thief. R. 146:122.
Thus, defense counsel suggested that the detective improperly manipulated the photo
spread to implicate defendant. Defense counsel, in fact, claimed that defendant's photo
"might as well have just [had] a sign" on it saying "Pick me." R. 146:122. Defense
counsel further argued that Salazar identified defendant at the preliminary hearing
because he had "seen the photo." R. 146:123.
The prosecutor had both the right and the responsibility to respond "to the theory
advanced by defense counsel in his final argument." Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. During
rebuttal, he therefore explained why the photo array was fair and how all the photographs
appeared to match Salazar's description of the thief. R. 146:127. He argued that the
photo spread did not, by itself, suggest to Salazar that he should select defendant's photo.
Id. He further noted that the detective who prepared the photo spread "didn't just pull
[defendant's] name out of the hat" and that "[t]here was some reason to put together a foil
lineup with his picture in there." Id.
Defense counsel's closing argument "opened the door" to the prosecutor's
argument. The prosecutor acted reasonably when he responded not only to an argument
that the photo array was suggestive, but also to the implication that Detective Pickreil had
11

"somehow manipulated this photo lineup, and that's how the victim picked him out."
R. 147: Tab 3, at 3. Where a defendant opens a door, a prosecutor's response is not
misconduct.
B.

The prosecutor's closing remarks did not violate defendant's confrontation
rights.

1.

This Court should not address this claim because defendant did not preserve
it and he does not argue plain error on appeal.
In conjunction with his claim that the prosecutor improperly called the jurors'

attention to matters that they should not properly have considered, defendant claims that
the prosecutor's rebuttal put hearsay testimony before the jury in violation of defendant's
confrontation rights. Br. Appellant at 12-14.
This claim is not properly before this Court. Defendant argued below that the
prosecutor's reference to the tip in closing argument was improper and inconsistent with
the limited purpose for which evidence of the tip was admitted. See R. 146:127
(discussion during prosecutor's closing rebuttal argument at trial); see also R. 94-95
(motion to arrest judgment); 147: Tab 3, 1-4 (hearing on motion to arrest judgment). He
claimed no violation of his confrontation rights.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). "[I]n the
interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Moreover, "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the
strategy of enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy
12

fails,... claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." Id. (internal quotation and
citation omitted) (brackets in original). To serve these policies, the Utah Supreme Court
has held that "the preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional
questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or
'plain error5 occurred." Id.
Moreover, to preserve a claim, a defendant must raise in the district court the
specific grounds for the objection stated on appeal. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,
361 (Utah App. 1993). Utah precedent requires "specific objections in order to bring all
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the
errors if appropriate." Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). The "specificity
requirement arises out of the trial court's need to assess allegations by isolating relevant
facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue."
Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). A general objection does not usually
provide that context. "The 'mere mention' of an issue without introducing supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for appeal." Id. (citation
omitted). "The objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very
error of which counsel complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998)
(objection to testimony on hearsay grounds does not preserve claims that testimony was
inadmissible on other grounds).
Defendant never claimed a violation of his confrontation rights below. He
therefore did not preserve that claim. Moreover, he does not argue on appeal that any
violation constituted plain error. This court should therefore decline to review his claim.
13

See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, \ 5, 63. P.3d 66 (declining to review constitutional
claim raised for the first time on appeal where defendant asserted neither plain error or
exceptional circumstances).
2.

In any case, the prosecutor's closing remarks did not violate defendant's
confrontation rights.
Defendant claims that jurors must have surmised that because the police officer

received a tip, someone must have told him that defendant stole the car and that such an
assertion is hearsay. Br. Appellant at 12. Defendant claims that the use of hearsay
evidence violated his confrontation rights. Id. at 13.
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant.. ., offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). "However, if
an out-of-court statement is offered to simply prove that it was made, without regard to
whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule." State in re G. Y.,
B.C., SM, andS.M., 962 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d
332, 335 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation and additional citation omitted)). Testimony
offered, not to prove that the statements are true, but to explain the reason for actions
taken, is not hearsay. Id. (statements for purpose of showing caseworker's subsequent
monitoring and reporting actions were not hearsay); see also United States v. Love, 767
F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that "an out of court statement is not hearsay if it
is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was
undertaken"); United States v. Robles, 814 F. Supp. 1233, 1242 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding
that witness statements regarding informant's tip "were not hearsay declarations because
14

they were not introduced for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matter asserted in
the statements, but rather, for the purpose of explaining the conduct of the Government
agents").
Here, no statement was entered into evidence—hence there was no hearsay.
Officer Pickrell merely testified that he included the photo because of an unspecified tip.
R. 146:77. The prosecutor never referred to any statement. R. 146:127.
Even if the testimony about the tip had included a statement, that testimony was
not offered for proof of the truth of the tip. Moreover, the prosecutor did not argue, when
referring to the tip, that the tip was truthful or that it was evidence that defendant
committed the offense. Id. Rather, testimony about the tip was admitted during the
State's case in chief to explain why the photo array was prepared and why defendant's
photo was included. R. 146:77-78. The prosecutor referred to the tip in rebuttal only to
explain why the photo array was prepared and to counter any suggestion that the
detective manipulated the spread to implicate defendant. R. 146:128.
In sum, evidence of the tip included no statement. The testimony was not
admitted or cited in rebuttal to prove the truth of whatever content the tip may have had.2
Hearsay testimony was not introduced or used, and defendant suffered no violation of his
confrontation rights.

In fact, at a later hearing on the matter, the trial court found that the prosecutor
did not refer to the tip for any improper purpose. R. 147: Tab 3, at 5; 121-22.
15

C.

In any event, in context, the prosecutor's remarks were not harmful.
In any event, defendant has not demonstrated harm. This Court reviews a claim of

prosecutorial conduct, not only to determine whether a prosecutor's remarks called
attention to matters the jurors could not properly consider, but also to determine "in light
of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," whether "there is a reasonable likelihood
that without the error the result would have been more favorable for the defendant."
Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151; Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925. "Further, because the trial court is in
the best position to determine the impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its
rulings . .. will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Longshaw, 961
P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998). For this reason, an appellate court will not overturn a
trial court's rulings on whether prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial absent an abuse of
discretion. See Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151.
1.

The jury learned nothing new in rebuttal.
Here, the jury learned nothing new in the prosecutor's rebuttal to defendant's

closing argument. Therefore, the prosecutor's closing statement reference to the tip
detectives received was harmless.
During his opening statement, the prosecutor explained, without objection, that the
police "got a tip from a confidential informant that the defendant may be a suspect in this
case. So with that tip, Detective Pickrell put together a photo lineup." R. 146:49.
Defendant did not object to this statement. Defendant did not object to the prosecution's
reference to the tip, and he did not request any kind of curative instruction. Thus, he
waived any claim of harm based on the jurors' exposure to this information. See
16

Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925 (failure to object or ask for a curative instruction waived
claim based on prosecutor's references to inadmissible bad acts). The prosecutor's
reference to the tip in rebuttal, now challenged on review, added nothing to this
statement. If prejudicial, it was no more prejudicial than the opening statement remark,
which defendant does not challenge on appeal. Defendant has therefore waived any
claim as to prejudice caused by the earlier statement, and does not demonstrate that the
rebuttal statement was in any way more prejudicial than the opening statement remark.
Later, during the State's case in chief, a prosecution witness, explaining the course
of his investigation, stated, "I got a lead. One of the gang detectives came to me, and a
confidential informant had told him that—." R. 146:77. Defendant objected to the
informant's statement coming in for the truth of the matter asserted, but did not object
when the trial court ruled that testimony that the officer received a tip could come in to
explain why the witness prepared the photo array and told the jurors that they could
consider the testimony for that limited purpose only. R. 146:77-78.
Further, the prosecutor referred to the tip again during his closing argument.
"Detective Pickrell just didn't pick his name out of a hat. Okay. He did have some
information .. . when he put that photo lineup together." R. 146:117. "He didn't do it
because he had a bias or something against him; he did it because he had that
information." Id. Again, defendant did not object. Defendant objected only when, in
rebuttal, the prosecution again stated that "[tjhere was some reason to put together a full
lineup." R. 146:127.
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Defendant's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement and other
references to the tip waived any claim of error based on those actions. Thus, defendant
can show prejudice based on the prosecutor's reference to the tip during rebuttal only if
he can demonstrate how the rebuttal statement was more harmful than the earlier
references to the same information. Defendant has not done that.
2.

The trial judge gave oral and written instructions limiting the use of
testimony about the tip. The prosecutor himself reiterated, in connection
with his reference to the testimony in rebuttal, the limited permissible use of
the evidence.
Further, the trial judge explained that evidence that a tip had been received should

be considered only to explain why police prepared a photo array that included
defendant's photo and not for the truth of tip itself. See R. 146:44, 78, 128; 51.
Moreover, the trial prosecutor himself reminded the jury that the judge had limited the
purposes for which they could consider the testimony. R. 146:128. In addition, the trial
court instructed the jury that statements and arguments of lawyers were not evidence in
the case. R. 50; 146:44. A court may "normally presume that a jury will follow an
instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is
an 'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating'
to the defendant." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) (citing Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (1987)). Nothing in this case suggests that the jury was
unable to follow the instructions below to limit use of testimony about the tip to the
purposes permitted by the trial court.
18

3.

In light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial, there is no reasonable
likelihood that the prosecutor's reference to the tip, even if improper, affected
the outcome.
Finally, "in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," there is no

reasonable likelihood that any improper reference to the tip affected the outcome. The
evidence against defendant was strong. Salazar, the car salesman, identified defendant
without difficulty. R. 146:61. Salazar stated that he had no doubt that defendant was the
individual who took the car for a test drive. R. 146:63.
Salazar was plagued by none of the factors that sometimes limit the ability of
victims to identify perpetrators. Salazar interacted with defendant in what appeared to be
a normal business transaction and was not caught up in the hurry, emotion, and fear
usually attendant to a robbery or assault. R. 146:54. Salazar spoke with defendant, who
represented himself as a potential purchaser, in full daylight on the car dealership lot for
about five minutes. R. 146:53-58. He observed that defendant was "six-one, 200 pounds
or so," his "hair [was] cut a little shorter on the bottom," and "he had a goatee."
R. 146:53. When Salazar first introduced himself to defendant, he noted defendant's
distinctive "little grin, a little smirk." R. 146:53, 62.
When shown the photo array, Salazar positively identified defendant. R. 146:61.
During the preliminary hearing, he again identified defendant, noting both his appearance
and the mannerism he characterized as "a little smirk." R. 146:62.
Defendant was unable to undermine Salazar's identification in cross-examination.
See R. 146:63-69. Defendant presented no witnesses or evidence to suggest that Salazar
was wrong.
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"[I]n light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," there exists no
reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecutor's rebuttal reference to the tip, "the result
would have been more favorable for the defendant." Pixel, 945 P.2d at 151; Humphrey,
793P.2dat925.
Moreover, the trial court found that the prosecutor's comments were harmless.
R. 121-22. The trial court was in the best position to determine the impact of the
prosecutor's statements upon the proceedings and properly exercised its discretion when
it ruled that any reference to the tip was harmless. See Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 927. This
Court should therefore reject defendant's claim of prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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